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VIDEO POKER: A SURVEY OF RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS SURROUNDING THE LEGAL AND
MORAL DEBATE
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, South Carolinians have engaged in a heated debate
involving video poker In fact, some have considered video poker "the most
important social and policy issue facing the state's citizens and elected
officials."2 Some of the most widely publicized debates have centered on
nonlegal issues such as the morality of video poker and the economic impact
the video poker industry has had on South Carolina citizens. Video poker
advocates have argued that video poker provides jobs and money.3 Opponents
of video poker argued that it contributes to moral decay, the break-up of
families, higher crime rates, and losses in worker productivity.4
The industry has had a turbulent legal history. In 1998 video poker
achieved a minor victory when the Supreme Court of South Carolina declared
that video poker was not an illegal lottery.' Since this ruling, however, video
poker has experienced numerous setbacks in the State's courts culminating in
the total ban of the industry. The purpose of this Note is to summarize the wide
range of legal developments that arose this past year regarding video poker and
to analyze some of these developments. Section II of this Note generally
provides the backdrop of the political battle of video poker over the past years.
Section HI examines gamblers' remedies under South Carolina's Gambling
Act.6 Section IV addresses issues presently concerning the video poker industry
which would have been key issues if the ban had not been imposed -
specifically a pending case in which video poker plaintiffs seek class
1. See generally Michael William Eisenrauch, Note, Video Poker and the Lottery Clause:
Where Common Law and Common Sense Collide, 49 S.C. L. REv. 549 (1998) (explaining the
evolution of video poker in South Carolina and the effect of South Carolina's lottery clause).
2. American Bingo Gets a Boost After South Carolina Court Upholds Video Gambling,
Dow JONES ONLiNENEWS, Nov. 19, 1998, available in WL SCNEWS (quoting South Carolina
Attorney General Charlie Condon).
3. Henry Eichel, Each Side's Poker 'Facts' Questioned, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.),
Sept. 26, 1999, at B1; see also Robert E. McCormick, An Analysis of Potential New Tax
Revenues on Video Poker Operations in South Carolina, at 1, 9 (Collins Entertainment,
Greenville, S.C., Aug. 1999) (on file with the SOUTH CAROLINALAWREVIEW) (noting that video
poker accounted for approximately $1.45 billion of income and 57,000 jobs in South Carolina
in 1998).
4. Eichel, supra note 3, at B1.
5. Johnson v. Collins Entertainment Co., 333 S.C. 96, 104, 508 S.E.2d 575, 579 (1998).
See generally Eisenrauch, supra note 1(explaining the evolution of video poker in South
Carolina and the effect of South Carolina's lottery clause until 1998).
6. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 32-1-10 to 32-1-290 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
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certification in a federal district court.7 Section IV also discusses two future
issues facing South Carolina courts in light of the video poker ban beginning
July 1, 2000: (1) whether video poker machines will become contraband per
se as of July 1, 2000, even if the machines are not operational; and (2) the
applicability of the Takings Clause to the video poker machine owners as of the
date video poker machines become illegal.
I1. THE POLITICAL BATTLE
Video poker supporters and opponents alike have held strong opinions
regarding the legality of video poker and have experienced various victories
and disappointments during the past year. Video poker opponents argued that
video poker is one of the "greatest threats to the state in its history."8 These
opponents supported a ban of video poker because they believe video poker
gambling has serious social impacts on crime and family unity.9 On the other
hand, supporters feared that a ban on video poker would have many of the
same effects because banning video poker will put people out of work and
cause South Carolina to lose money.'"
After the 1998 South Carolina Supreme Court decision holding that video
poker is not an illegal lottery," supporters viewed Jim Hodges's gubernatorial
election as the next positive step in the future of the industry.' 2 The 1998
governor's race often centered around the issue of a state-wide lottery and
whether to ban video poker. While Republican David Beasley, South
Carolina's incumbent governor, supported a ban of video poker, Democrat Jim
Hodges supported a state-wide referendum allowing voters to decide whether
or not to keep video poker legal but heavily taxed.'3 Issues arose during the
race regarding campaign contributions supplied by the video poker owners to
both candidates.'4 Advertisements also surfaced suggesting that Democrats and
video poker owners were tied to the mob and organized crime.'
Even after Hodges won the election, the video poker fight was far from
over. The South Carolina State House of Representatives stood firm against
7. Johnson v. Collins Entertainment, No. 3:97-2136-17 (D.S.C filed Jul. 16, 1997).
8. Murray Glenn, Justices Rule Video PokerLegal: Decision WillBringBoomfor Upstate
Businesses, SPARTANBURG HERALD-JOURNAL, Nov. 20, 1998, at Al.
9. Id.
10. Eichel, supra note 3, at BI; see also McCormick, supra note 3, at 1, 9.
11. Johnson v. Collins Entertainment, 333 S.C. 96, 508 S.E.2d 575 (1998).
12. Michael Sponhour, 3,0OONew Video PokerMachinesLicensed, THESTATE(Columbia,
S.C.), Feb. 11, 1999, at Al.
13. New GOP Ads Suggest Poker Industry Tied to Mob, THE HERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.),
Mar. 31, 1998, at 8A [hereinafter New GOP Ads].
14. Hodges Gets Helpfron Industry, THEHERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.), Jan. 18, 1998, at 8B.
15. See New GOP Ads, supra note 13, at 8A; Legislators Stand Firm on $125 Poker Cap,
SPARTANBURG HERALD-JOURNAL, May 14, 1999, at Al [hereinafter Legislators Stand Firm].
1066 Vol. 51: 1065
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 4 [2000], Art. 22
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol51/iss4/22
VIDEO POKER
efforts to abolish some of the restrictions on the industry.' 6 Section 2791 of the
Video Games Machines Act' 7 limited payouts to $125 a game for credits earned
while playing video poker.'8 Although the Video Games Machines Act has
been in effect since 1993, the payout cap had not been enforced for the
following six years. 9
III. THE COURTS WEIGH IN
A. Federal Court: Johnson v. Collins Entertainment Co.
In April of 1999, Federal District Judge Joseph F. Anderson issued a
permanent injunction against video poker owners and operators from paying
more than $125 per hand in Johnson v. Collins Entertainment Co." The
plaintiffs were addicted gamblers alleging that violations of various state laws
by video poker owners and operators induced the plaintiffs to gamble
excessively.2' The case was removed to federal court because one of the
plaintiffs' claims involved the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO).'
The plaintiffs requested a permanent injunction against the defendants
enforcing the payout limit of $125 per day pursuant to section 12-21-2791.23
The defendants argued that there were two possible interpretations of the
statute. First, that the statute could be interpreted to allow the full amount of the
winnings to be paid to the gambler, but the gambler could only receive up to
$125 per day. 4 In other words, ifaplayer won $500 in a hand, the player could
receive up to $125 a day for four consecutive days. Second, the defendants
argued that the statute could be interpreted to allow payouts of any amount as
long as the payout did not equal more than $125 above the amount placed in
the machine.rs The federal district court rejected the defendants' contentions
and interpreted section 12-21-2791 of the South Carolina Code as "set[ting] a
maximum cash payout [of $125 a day] regardless of the amount of money
placed in the machine." '6
16. Legislators Stand Firm, supra note 15, at Al (reporting that House legislators are
standing firm on the $125 a day winning cap for video poker players).
17. S.C.CODEANN. § 12-21-2791 (West Supp. 1999),repealedby 1997 ActNo. 125, Part
I, § 8 (eff. July 1, 2000).
18. Johnson v. Collins Entertainment Co., 1999 WL 1565207, *1 (D.S.C. Apr. 28, 1999).
19. Id. at *5.
20. Id.; see also Johnson v. Collins Entertainment Co., 1999 WL 1565199 (D.S.C. Apr. 28,
1999).
21. Johnson, 1999 WL 1565199, at *1.
22. Id.
23. Id. at *2
24. Id. at *7.
25. Id.
26. Id. at *6.
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The defendants appealed Judge Anderson's ruling and the Fourth Circuit
reversed the injunction, holding that the district court should have abstained
from interpreting South Carolina's state law." Even though the case was
removed because of the RICO claim, which presents a federal question, the
essence of the RICO claims were based on interpretation of state law.28
Therefore, the injunction enforcing the $125 payout cap was vacated and
remanded in order for the state courts to interpret the state statutes in question."
The appeal was not decided until December 27, 1999, after the statewide
video poker referendum was ultimately found unconstitutional. Therefore, the
lifting of the injunction will soon be moot.
B. South Carolina's Gambling Act and Justice v. Pantry
South Carolina's Gambling Act was enacted to prevent gamblers from
losing income as a result of gambling, and thus leaving their families without
money for food and shelter.3" Based upon cases addressing the application of
the statutes, it appears the Act was readily enforced and the penalties imposed
were of great concern to video poker machine owners and operators.
Under South Carolina's Gambling Act, video poker machine operators are
liable for treble damages to plaintiffs that sue on behalf of players who lose
money.31 Section 32-1-10 creates a cause of action against video poker
machine operators when a person, in one sitting, loses fifty dollars or more.32
The legislature adopted the statute to protect the family of the gambler from the
gambler's addiction or impulses.3 3 Section 32-1-20 permits anyone, except the
player who loses the money, to bring suit against the owners and operators of
the machines for treble damages.3 ' A player may sue on her own behalf to
recover losses within three months, but may not recover treble damages.
In another setback for video poker machine owner and operators, the South
Carolina Supreme Court held in Justice v. Pantrj?6 that plaintiffs are not
required to specify the dates in which money was lost.37 In Justice, the plaintiff
filed suit under section 32-1-20 against several convenience store owners to
27. Id. Johnson v. Collins Entertainment Co., 199 F.3d 710, 715 (4th Cir. 1999).
28. Id. at 722.
29. Id. at 729.
30. See Johnson v. Collins Entertainment Co., 1999 WL 1565199, *7 (1999); Berkebile
v. Outen, 311 S.C. 50, 55, 426 S.E.2d 760, 763 (1993); McCurry v. Keith, 325 S.C. 441,444,
481 S.E.2d 166, 168 (Ct. App. 1997).
31. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 32-1-10, 32-1-20 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
32. § 32-1-10.
33. See Berkebile v. Outen, 311 S.C. 50, 54, 426 S.E.2d 760, 763 (1993); McCurry v.
Keith, 325 S.C. 441,444, 481 S.E.2d 166, 168 (Ct. App. 1997).
34. § 32-1-20.
35. Mullinax v. J.M. Brown Amusement Co., 333 S.C. 89,93,508 S.E.2d 848,849 (1998).
36. Justice v. Pantry, 335 S.C. 572,518 S.E.2d 40 (1999).
37. Id. at 579, 518 S.E.2d at43.
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recover gambling losses incurred by his mother and sister.38 The defendants
claimed that the plaintiff's complaint was insufficiently pled. 9 The plaintiff
alleged in his complaint that" on several dates throughout the calendar years
of 1995-1996, [sister/mother] of the Plaintiff, while gambling on the poker
video [sic] machines, owned and/or operated by the Defendants, lost in excess
of Fifty Dollars ($50.00) per sitting."' Even though the complaint failed to
mention when or to whom the losses occurred, the court held that the complaint
sufficiently alleged the statutory elements of the cause of action because it
stated that plaintiff's mother and sister lost money in excess of fifty dollars at
one sitting using machines owned or operated by the defendants.4 The dates
of the losses were not required in the complaint, even to determine whether the
one-year statute of limitations is valid.42
The Gambling Act, however, does not always assure gamblers of holding
a winning hand. One limitation to recovery involves the defendant's right to a
setoff of the plaintiff's recoverable damages by the amount that the gambler
won while gambling.43 The court stated, "[t]he intent of the legislature... was
to punish excessive gambling and protect the gambler and his family against
the gambler's excesses, not to give gamblers a windfall."'
After Justice, video poker owners and operators faced the prospect of
lawsuits, not by their customers, but by anyone with knowledge of a customer's
loss resulting from playing video poker.4' Since section 32-1-20 does not limit
standing to a family member (whom the statute was intended to protect), an
owner has little protection from paying threefold the amount of money lost in
the machines. This broad conception of standing threatens numerous lawsuits
with exposure to high awards of damages.
If the video poker referendum had proceeded and voters had decided to
keep video poker legalized, section 32-1-10 would have been changed so that
gamblers could no longer sue for losses over fifty dollars.' Due to the video
poker ban, section 32-1-60 will be enacted which will limit the application of
sections 32-1-10, 32-1-20, and 32-1-30 "only to those gambling activities not
authorized by law." Therefore, because video gambling will no longer be
authorized by law, any losses incurred through video gambling will still be
38. Id. at 575, 518 S.E.2d at41.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 577-78, 518 S.E.2d at 43.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 579, 518 S.E.2d at 43-44.
43. McCurry, 325 S.C. at 444, 481 S.E.2d at 168.
44. Id. at 446, 481 S.E.2d at 169.
45. But see Mullinax v. J.M. Brown Amusement Co., 333 S.C. 89, 93, 508 S.E.2d 848,
849 (1998) (acknowledging that if the plaintiff acted in collusion with the gambler on whose
behalf the action was brought recovery would be barred).
46. Payout Cap Traded for Referendum, THE HERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.), June 17, 1999,
at 1A [hereinafter Payout Cap].
47. 1999 S.C. Acts 125 § 18.
2000 VIDEO POKER 1069
5
Luttrell: Video Poker: A Survey of Recent Developments Surrounding the Lega
Published by Scholar Commons, 2000
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
punishable by treble damages against the owner or operator of the video poker
machine used by the gambler.
C. RICO and Video Poker
In Gentry v. Yonce,4" the South Carolina Supreme Court held that video
poker operators may now be classified as racketeers under RICO.49 The
plaintiffs filed a class action suit against the owners and operators of video
poker machines in Saluda and Newberry counties alleging violations of RICO
and South Carolina's Unfair Trade Practices Act."0 The circuit court dismissed
the RICO claim because the plaintiffs failed to plead that claim with
particularity, as required under Rule 9(b) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure."' The supreme court reversed, holding that only RICO claims
alleging fraud need to be pled with particularity.
5 2
To establish a claim under RICO, plaintiffs must prove that the owner of
the video poker establishment received a substantial source of business from
gambling machines, and committed at least one other act that carries the
possibility of imprisonment for more than a year. 3 If found guilty of a civil
RICO violation, machine owners must pay threefold damages to the plaintiff
and the cost of the suit, including attorneys' fees. 4
Congress enacted RICO under Title IX of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970"s to combat organized crime.5 6 Today, most civil RICO suits have
nothing to do with organized crime. 7 In 1990, the House of Representatives
recognized that many people were using civil RICO in ways Congress did not
intend.58 Thus, Congress amended the statute and intended to limit private
litigants' use of RICO in civil cases. 9 In fact, Congress specifically stated that
all RICO claims must be plead with particularity.' Gentry simplifies plaintiffs'
pleadings not involving fraudulent claims in civil RICO cases, contrary to
Congress's intentions.
48. 337 S.C. 1, 522 S.E.2d 137 (1999).
49. Id. at 11,522 S.E.2d at 143.
50. Id. at 4, 522 S.E.2d at 13 8-39.
51. Id. at 4-5, 522 S.E.2d at 139.
52. Id. at 6-7, 522 S.E.2d at 139.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(I)(A) (Supp. I1 1998).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (Supp. 1 1998).
55. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988)).
56. Id. (statement of Findings and Purpose).
57. H.R. Rep. No. 102-312 at 4 (1991).
58. H.R. Rep. No. 102-312 at 5.
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Seven elements constitute a RICO cause of action: 6' (1) the commission
of two or more predicate acts 2 (2) which constitute a pattern3 (3) of
racketeering activity' through which (4) the culpable person (5) invests in,
maintains an interest in, participates in, or conspires to do any of the preceding
in (6) an enterprise, and (7) such activities affect interstate commerce."
Usually, the predicate acts required under RICO include acts of fraud66 or are
treated as acts of fraud for the purposes of establishing a RICO violation. 7
When the predicate acts involve fraud, it is undisputed that the pleadings must
be stated with particularity." However, when the predicate acts of an alleged
RICO violation do not involve fraud, courts are split regarding the applicability
of Rule 9(b).69
The court in Gentry recognized that some courts require that particularity
must be plead in all RICO claims, regardless of the presence of fraud.7 °
However, because the underlying predicate acts involved violations of a South
Carolina statute, not fraud, the court held Plaintiffs' pleadings need not comply
61. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1962 (1994 & Supp. III 1998); Gentry, 337 S.C. 1, 6 n.3, 522
S.E.2d 137, 139 n.3 (1999) (citing Roper v. Dynamique Concepts, 316 S.C. 131,447 S.E.2d 218
(1994)).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5); Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,527 (1985) (stating thatjust
two predicate acts are insufficient to constitute a per se pattern of racketeering activity). The
Sedima test was applied by the Fourth Circuit. See, e.g., HMK Corp. v. Walsey, 828 F.2d 1071,
1074 (4thCir. 1987) (refusing to adopt an all-encompassing definition ofpattern but holding that
the "existence of a pattern thus depends on context, particularly on the nature of the underlying
offenses"); see also LaVay Corp. v. Dominion Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 830 F.2d 522,529 (4th
Cir. 1987) (finding that a single breach of fiduciary duty did not constitute pattern).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (a pattern of racketeering activity requires at least two acts of
racketeering activities within ten years of each other).
64. Racketeering activity includes any act or threat involving gambling chargeable under
State law and is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(A)
(Supp. III 1998).
65. Roper v. Dynamique Concepts, Inc., 316 S.C. 131,142,447 S.E.2d 218,224 (1994).
66. See Florida Dep't of Ins. v. Debenture Guar., 921 F. Supp. 750, 754-55 (M.D. Fla.
1996) (allegations of securities fraud); Grant v. Union Bank, 629 F. Supp. 570, 575 (D. Utah
1986) (allegations of mail and wire fraud); Crystal v. Foy, 562 F. Supp. 422, 424-25 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (allegations of fraudulent conduct violating the Securities Exchange Act).
67. See Plount v. American Home Assurance Co., 668 F. Supp. 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1987);
Schnitzer v. Oppenheimer & Co., 633 F. Supp. 92 (D. Or. 1985); Taylor v. Bear Stems & Co.,
572 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Ga. 1983). But see Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp.,
742 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. District Council, 778 F. Supp. 738 (S.D.N.Y.
1991); United States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family, 683 F. Supp. 1411 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
68. "In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake
shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a
person may be averred generally." S.C. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
69. See Plount, 668 F. Supp. at 207 (holding Rule 9 applies); Schnitzer, 633 F. Supp. at
97 (finding Rule 9 applies); Taylor, 572 F. Supp. at 682 (finding Rule 9 applies). But see Seville
Indus. Marsh. Corp., 742 F.2d at 791-92 (finding Rule 9 does not apply); District Council, 778
F. Supp. at 746-47 (holding Rule 9 does not apply); Bonanno Organized Crime Family, 683 F.
Supp. 1421-28 (finding Rule 9 does not apply).
70. Gentry v. Yonce, 337 S.C. 1, 7, 522 S.E.2d 137, 140 (1999).
2000 1071
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with Rule 9.71 The court only cited one decision dated after the 1990 RICO
Amendment which was filed prior to enactment of the House Report dated
October 27, 1990.72 The rest of the cases cited were decided before the 1990
Amendment.73
The predicate acts by the video poker machine operators and owners
include offering special inducements to customers through logos on the
machines offering a "jackpot"74 and receiving primary or substantial gross
proceeds from video gaming devices.75 Because video poker casino owners
inherently receive their primary or substantial gross proceeds from video
gaming devices, any other predicate act, which may be minor by itself, will
subject video poker casino owners to RICO claims. The potential for civil
RICO suits is extremely damaging to owners of video poker casinos or other
defendants involved in cases in which the predicate acts are not fraudulent
because a successful plaintiff can recover threefold the damages sustained in
the suit, including reasonable attorney fees.76
Since video poker will become unlawful this summer, Gentry's only
impact on the video poker industry is on pending cases and cases filed based
on acts occurring prior to July 1, 2000. However, the supreme court's ruling
that nonfraudulent predicate acts do not have to be plead with particularity
increases the availability of RICO claims, regardless of whether the case
involves video poker issues.
D. The Referendum and Joytime Distributors v. State: The Death of
Video Poker
In May of 1999, both the Senate and the House heavily debated whether
to raise the payout cap to $900 a hand instead of the existing limit of $125 per
day.77 The House ultimately succeeded in keeping the $125 a day cap on
winnings,7 but only after their June 16, 1999 compromise which scheduled a
71. Id. at 8, 522 S.E.2d at 140.
72. Id. at 6,522 S.E.2d at 140 (citing United States v. District Council, 778 F. Supp. 738
(S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
73. Id. at6,522 S.E.2d 140 (citing Plountv. American Home Assurance Co., 668 F. Supp.
204 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Schnitzer v. Oppenheimer & Co., 633 F. Supp. 92 (D. Or. 1985); Taylor
v. Bear Steams & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667 (N.D.Ga. 1983).
74. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-21-2804(B), (F) (West Supp. 1998) (prohibiting the offering of
special inducements and subjecting willful violators to punishments of up to ten thousand dollars
or imprisonment of no more than two years, or both).
75. S.C. CODEANN. § 12-21-2804(A), (F) (West Supp. 1998) (prohibiting businesses from
receiving primary or substantial gross proceeds from video gaming devices and subjecting
violators to punishment of up to ten thousand dollars or imprisonment ofno more than two years,
or both).
76. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (Supp. 1111998).
77. Legislators Stand Firm, supra note 15, at Al.
78. Id.
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referendum for November 2, 1999.29 The referendum's purpose was to allow
the public to decide whether video poker should remain legal. ° If voters
decided to keep video poker, the referendum would raise the payout cap to
$500 per sitting and impose a gambling business tax expected to raise
approximately $132.5 million a year." If voters rejected video poker, all video
poker payouts would cease by June 30, 2000.82
For the most part, both sides of the video poker debate wanted the
referendum to proceed.' However, Joytime Distributors & Amusement
Company of Greenville (Joytime) challenged the constitutionality of the
referendum." Joytime asserted that Part I of the referendum, which would
have determined whether payouts would be allowed to continue in South
Carolina, was an "unconstitutional delegation ofpowerby the legislature to the
voters of this State." 5 The South Carolina Supreme Court agreed, holding that
Part 11 of the referendum was unconstitutional because South Carolina's
Constitution did not give the people the right of direct legislation by
referendum. 6 Because the court also held that Part II of the referendum was
severable from the rest of the referendum,87 Part I of the Act, which bans video
poker as of July 1, 2000, stands unless the General Assembly decides
otherwise.88
With this decision, the state's highest court effectively killed the video
poker industry. Now, even before the ban comes into effect, the industry is
experiencing losses.89 Video poker's gross profit is down thirty-one percent
from 1999 and seventeen percent from 1998, and the South Carolina
Department of Revenue expects profits to continue falling.90 Video poker
opponents are thrilled with the apparent end of video poker in South Carolina
and do not expect the legislature to revisit the issue." On the other hand, video
79. Payout Cap, supra note 46, at 1A.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Sarah O'Donnell, Operators Get Look at Life After Referendum, THE HERALD (Rock
Hill, S.C.), Sept. 1, 1999, at IA.
83. Jim Davenport, Video Gambling Referendum Arguments Heard in Supreme Court,
ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWsWiREs, Oct. 12, 1999, available in WL, APWIRES.
84. Sarah O'Donnell, Supreme Court Decision Cancels Nov. 2 Referendum, THE HERALD
(Rock Hill, S.C.), Oct. 15, 1999, at IA.
85. Joytime Distributors and Amusement Co. v. State, No. 25007, 1999 WL 969280, at




89. Chris Roberts, Poker Industry Breathing Its Last, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Feb.
15, 2000, atB1.
90. Id.
91. O'Donnell, supra note 84, at IA.
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9
Luttrell: Video Poker: A Survey of Recent Developments Surrounding the Lega
Published by Scholar Commons, 2000
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
poker advocates have not acquiesced and are now exploring the possibility of
other lawsuits.'
IV. CONTINUING AND FuTuRE LmGATION INVOLVING THE VIDEO POKER
INDUSTRY
Although many legal issues stemming from the video poker controversy
will be moot as of the effective date of the video poker ban, some issues
involving video poker will continue even after the industry is dead. Further,
new issues will emerge as a result of the ban. One on-going class action case
brought by addicted gamblers, Johnson v. Collins Entertainment,93 explores
whether the Fourth Circuit will apply a strict or liberal construction of Rule 23
when certifying a class of plaintiffs. Even though the plaintiffs seeking
certification in Johnson are gamblers, the outcome of the case will affect the
certification of future class actions within the Fourth Circuit's jurisdiction,
regardless of the parties' involvement in the video poker industry.
Future litigation will address whether video poker machines will be
considered "contraband" and whether South Carolina's declaration that
personal property which is lawful when purchased, but later declared unlawful,
constitutes a "taking" of the property.94 Recently decided cases in South
Carolina involving these issues serve as aids in anticipating the outcome of
future contraband and "takings" litigation.9"
A. Class Certification
One of the newest video poker controversies involves a potential class
action against video poker machine owners.96 Specifically, the debate centers
around whether the federal court should certify the plaintiffs' class against the
video poker defendants.' Plaintiffs claim, among other things, injuries under
RICO.
92. See id.; Jeff Wilkinson, Tears, Cheers and Jeers Greet Poker's Death Sentence, THE
STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Oct. 15, 1999, atAl (noting owners ofvideo poker machines may file
federal lawsuits for "taking of property" if the machines are considered contraband after July 1,
2000).
93. Johnson v. Collins Entertainment, No. 3:97-2136-17 (D.S.C filed Jul. 16, 1997).
94. Clif LeBlanc, State Threatens to Seize, Destroy 'Illegal' Machines, THE STATE
(Columbia, S.C.), Oct. 16, 1999 at Al. As this Note was going to press, the South Carolina
Supreme Court agreed to consider a lawsuit filed by two Greenville video poker companies. The
plaintiffs allege a taking of private property and denial of due process. ClifLeBlanc, S. C. High
Court to Hear Latest Poker Lawsuit, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), June 2,2000, at Bl.
95. See South Carolina v. 192 Coin-Operated Video Game Machines, 338 S.C. 176,525
S.E.2d 872 (2000); Mibbs v. Department of Revenue, 337 S.C. 601, 524 S.E.2d 626 (1999).
96. Johnson v. Collins Entertainment, No. 3:97-2136-17 (D.S.C filed Jul. 16, 1997).
97. Id.
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1. Recent U.S. Supreme Court Interpretation of Class Certification
A consideration of recent decisions relating to class certification is helpful
when anticipating what the district court might do in Johnson. In the most
recent Supreme Court case addressing the issue of class certification, Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor," the Court strictly construed Rule 23 and denied
class certification in a mass tort claim." The Court said the plaintiffs failed to
meet the requirements of class certification due to an inability to prove
commonality of issues of fact and law and adequacy of representation.00 The
lead plaintiffs were workers who were occupationally exposed or received
bystander exposure through the occupation of a spouse to the defendant's
asbestos products.' Some plaintiffs manifested physical injuries related to the
asbestos exposure, while others were exposed to the asbestos but had not yet
developed any existing injuries. 2
The Supreme Court strictly construed the second step of the class
certification test,0 3 applying Rule 23(b)(3).'" InAmchem common questions
of law or fact did not predominate over questions of law or fact unique to the
individual members, even though all class members were exposed to asbestos
and maintained an interest in receiving compensation."5 Evidence of non-
commonality between class members included exposure by class members to
different asbestos products, varying times of exposure, differences in extent of
98. Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). Amchem was a "settlement"
class action. Both sides of the asbestos litigation participated in designing the class and
presenting it to the court. The Court held that these types of class actions must also meet Federal
Rule 23's requirements. Id. at 597-605, 619-21.
99. Id. at 597
100. Id. at 622-28.
101. Id. at602.
102. Id. at591.
103. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a). A two-step test must be satisfied before the court will certify
a class. Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997). The first step entails
satisfying four prerequisites identified in Rule 23(a), including numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequacy of representation. Id. Next, the party seeking certification must
determine and satisfy at least one of the requirements under Rule 23(b): (1) failure to maintain
a class action would prejudice the opposing party, (2) the opposing party has acted or refused
to act on grounds generally acceptable by the class, or (3) a class action is superior to other forms
of adjudication. Id. at 614-15.
The party seeking class certification carries the burden of proof in demonstrating that
certification of the class is proper. See General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982); In
Re A. H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709,728 (4th Cir. 1989). In order to maintain a class action, the
seeking party must prove the existence of an identifiable class and that the entire party seeking
certification is a member of the proposed class. Id.
104. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 622. Rule 23(b)(3) requires two additional requirements beyond
the Rule 23(a) prerequisites. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). First, the questions common to the class
must predominate over individual questions, and second, class resolution must be the superior
method of adjudication. Id.
105. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 624.
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the injuries, and differences in causation, such as the effect of cigarette
smoking on the respective asbestos-related disease." 6
Further, the Court found that a class action form of adjudication is not
always superior to individual adjudication.' Representatives will not protect
unnamed class members from unjust or unfair settlements because the
representative class members do not have common interests with the rest of the
class.10
2. Fourth Circuit's Liberal Construction Before andAfter Amchem
Prior to Amchem, the Fourth Circuit applied a liberal construction of Rule
23 when determining whether to certify a class." In ReA.H. Robins involved
class certification of a mass tort suit involving the Dalkon Shield, an
intrauterine birth control device."0 Plaintiffs sought class certification in an
action against Aetna, the manufacturer's insurer, for injuries resulting from the
defective device."' Prior to a final determination on certification, the parties
entered into a settlement conditioned on certification." 2 The Fourth Circuit
affirmed the class certification and settlement orders."
3
The court applied a liberal construction of the two-step test requiring
plaintiffs to meet all prerequisites of Rule 23(a) and at least one requirement of
Rule 23(b)."' Because the primary defense in mass tort litigation involving
products liability varies little among individuals in relation to the large amount
of time required to maintain individual trials, the court supported allowing a
class action because it benefits the court and litigants by conserving the time
and resources of both." s
The court criticized the "strict scrutiny" standard of construction when it
held that the proper standard of determining the applicability of a class action
is to favor class actions rather than oppose them."6 The court further held that
individualized damages do not disqualify members from a class, as suggested
in Amchem, because judicially approved settlements, compared to separate
trials, more efficiently determine the disbursement of the total settlement
among class members." 7
106. Id.
107. Id. at 623.
108. Id. at623 &n.18.





114. Id. at 728-29.
115. Id. at 734-35.
116. Id. at 729.
117. Id. at 735.
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Contrary to In Re A.H. Robins, courts no longer liberally construe Rule 23
in certifying class actions since the Supreme Court's ruling in Armchem. For
example, in Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., "' the Fourth
Circuit applied a strict construction of Rule 23 when it reversed the holding of
the district court approving certification of plaintiffs' class because the class
representatives did not suffer the same injury or have the same interest as the
rest of the class."9
The court noted that although the breakdown of the class into categories
provided evidence that the class representatives of the same category shared
similar interests and injuries with the rest of their category, the class as a whole
was not similar.2 In its determination that the plaintiffs failed to prove
common questions of fact or law the Fourth Circuit considered five factors.'
First, the allegations involved multiple contracts among the plaintiffs."
Second, some of the allegations involved oral statements between the plaintiffs
and defendants, which likely varied between the members of the class."2 Third,
the court considered the allegations of fraudulent representations by the
defendant further evidence that the proposed class lacked common questions
of law or factbecause the fraudulent representations likely differedbetween the
purchasers. 4 Fourth, the court found that tolling the statute of limitations on
plaintiffs' claims could only be applied on an individual basis."2 Finally, the
court concluded that the determination of claims for lost profit damages must
be done on an individual basis. 6
Class certification is often denied in cases involving allegations of fraud. 2
Fraud cases usually require plaintiffs to demonstrate their inability to discover
the omitted information elsewhere, which requires a case-by-case analysis.'2 8
3. Application to Johnson v. Collins Entertainment
The Fourth Circuit may conclude that the video poker plaintiffs do not
meet the predominance requirements as set forth inAmchem. In orderto satisfy
118. Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 1998).
119. Id. at 344.
120. Id. at 338.
121. Id. at 340.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 340-41.
124. Id. at 341. The court pointed out that class certification is often denied in cases
involving allegations of fraud. Id. Fraud cases usually require plaintiffs to demonstrate their
inability to discover the omitted information elsewhere, which requires a case-by -case analysis.
Id. at 342; see also Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734,745 (5th Cir. 1996) (denying
class certification in any fraud actions in which reliance on the fraud is an issue).
125. Broussard, 155 F.3d at 342.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 342 (citing Zimmerman v. Bell, 800 F.2d 386, 390 (4th Cir. 1986)).
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the predominance requirement, questions of law or fact common to all of the
members in the class must exist.29
InAmchem the court found common exposure by the plaintiffs to asbestos
products manufactured by the defendants was not enough to establish that the
class representatives could adequately represent the unnamed class members. 30
Accordingly, in Johnson v. Collins Entertainment, the mere commonality of
class members losing money to the defendant video poker representatives may
not adequately satisfy the predominance requirement. Plaintiffs must also prove
common causation for the losses to the video poker defendants, along with
other factors common to the class members, unless the plaintiffs succeed in
showing that all the class members lost money in video poker machines as a
result of illegal inducement by the defendants.
As pointed out in Amchem, the predominance criterion is much more
demanding than simply having contact with a product produced or under the
control of the Defendants.' The differences between the video pokerplaintiffs
seems analagous to the differences between the asbestos-exposed plaintiffs in
Amchem. The court in Amchem noted that "[c]lass members were exposed to
different asbestos-containing products, for different amounts of time, in
different ways, and over different periods."' 32 Furthermore, the class members
suffered various damages, and individual causation histories as a result of
differing smoking histories.'33
Likewise, video poker class members undoubtedly were exposed to video
poker for different durations of time, for differing time periods, and used
various machines with different owners. Accordingly, class members will have
different damages which must be determined on an individual basis based on
the amount of money lost to the defendants setoff by the amount of money
won. Finally, causation will differ among class members because some will
claim the jackpot logos induced them, others will claim to be addictive
gamblers, and still others may claim additional reasons for playing the video
poker machines.
B. Video Poker Machine Owners and Operators as Claimants
Contrary to most of the present and past litigation surrounding the video
poker issue, future litigation will likely be initiated by the video poker industry
instead of addicted gamblers. Until the video poker ban, gamblers brought suits
against the owners and operators in order to recover their gambling losses.
After the ban, the industry will lose significant amounts of money as well as the
129. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
130. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625-26.
131. Id. at 623-24.
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machines themselves and will want to seek restitution.'34 One way the poker
industry may try to reduce their losses is by selling their machines to states that
still allow video poker. Another way the industry may try to reduce their losses
will be by instituting claims under the takings clause. 3 ' Recent cases supply a
preview of how the courts are likely to resolve these issues.
1. Video Poker Machines as Contraband
Determining whether property is contraband is important because seized
property which is not contraband should be returned to the owner once any
criminal proceedings are completed. 3 6 Onthe other hand, contraband materials
may not be returned to their rightful owner, even if the seizure of the material
was improper or the person connected with the material was not convicted of
a crime.
37
There are two types of contraband: (1) contraband per se and (2) derivative
contraband."' Property considered "contraband per se" is inherently unlawful
to possess, such as illegal drugs. 139 Since a person cannot have a property right
in material that is not subject to legal possession, the government does not need
to file a forfeiture action to retain items which are contraband per se."
"Derivative contraband," on the other hand, are items that are only illegal based
upon use. 4' For example, if an automobile is used in a felony, it is derivative
contraband. 42 Derivative contraband is only forfeited pursuant to statute, so a
forfeiture hearing is required in order for the government to retain the
property. 43
In a recent case, South Carolina v. 192 Coin-Operated Video Game
Machines,'" the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that video poker
machines, deemed illegal under section 12-21-2710 of the South Carolina
Code,45 were contraband per se and could be destroyed by the state, even
though they were only being stored in a warehouse and were not operational.'"
134. LeBlanc, supra note 94, at Al.
135. Justices Offer Road Map for Video Poker Endgame, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.),
Feb. 20,2000, at D2 [hereinafter Justices Offer Road Map]. See text accompanying supra note
94 regarding recent video poker litigation.
136. Boggs v. Merletti, 987 F. Supp. 1, 9 (D.D.C. 1997).







144. 338 S.C. 176,525 S.E.2d 872 (2000).
145. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-21-2710 (West Supp. 1999). Section 12-21-2710 presently
makes it illegal "to keep on the premises or operate" video poker machines unless they have the
free play feature and meet specific requirements.
146. 192 Coin-Operated Video Game Machines, 338 S.C. atl90, 525 S.E.2d at 879.
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The Appellants, owners of the machines, argued thatbecause the machines
were not fully operational, they were not illegal. 47 Using the terminology set
forth in Boggs v. Merletti," the owners argued that the video poker machines
were derivative contraband, but not contraband per se. If the machines were
derivative contraband, the state could only retain them if the machines were
used in the furtherance of a crime and forfeited pursuant to a statute, which
requires a hearing.49
The court, however, held "[t]he plain language of the statute [section 12-
21-2710] makes clear the legislature's intent to outlaw mere possession of such
machines."'5 Thus, mere possession of the machines was unlawful and
violated section 12-21-2710 regardless of whether the machines were
operational.
Interestingly, the court conceded that the machines would not have been
considered contraband if they were only illegal as a result of a county-wide
referendum terminating cash payouts.' Section 12-21-2809 of the South
Carolina Code provides that even though no licenses for coin-operated devices
may be issued for machines in counties where payouts were made illegal by
referendum, "a person may... possess these machines in the county... for
[the exclusive] purposes of storage, maintenance, or transportation."'
52
Therefore, machines may be stored in counties where referendums have
terminated cash payouts for credits, but the machines are not otherwise
unlawful.'53 Section 12-21-2809 did not apply in this case because the
machines did not become illegal by the result of a county referendum. " Only
those owners whose machines were affected by a referendum could claim the
protection of the storage provision of section 12-21-2809.'
The court's holding in 192 Coin-Operated Video Game Machines will be
especially important to the video poker industry as of July 1, 2000 because
South Carolina courts may be presented with other cases dealing with whether
the machines are contraband per se. 56 By converting all video poker machines
into contraband per se as of July 2000, owners will lose money and property
since their machines may be destroyed before they can be sold out of state or
another use for the machines can be found. Section 12-21-2809 offers no
succor because it will be repealed effective July 1, 2000.' Therefore, courts
147. Id. at 187-88, 525 S.E.2d at 878-79.
148. 987 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1997).
149. Id. at 10.
150. 192 Coin-Operated Video Game Machines, 330 S.C. at 188, 525 S.E.2d at 879.
151. Id.
152. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-21-2809 (West Supp. 1999).
153. 192 Coin-Operated Video Game Machines, 330 S.C. at 190, 525 S.E.2d at 879.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Justices Offer Road Map, supra note 135, at D2.
157. 1999 S.C. Acts 125, § 8.
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will likely render a harsh ruling that video poker machines are contraband per
se, even if they are just being stored.'58
One reason for the strictness of this result probably stems from the fact that
the court decided 192 Coin-Operated Video Game Machines on February 7,
2000, after the ban was announced. In an effort to reduce anticipated future
litigation, this case appears to establish a bright-line rule that any machines,
which are unlawful by statute, are inherently illegal and may be destroyed.
Practically, however, the legislature's intent to prevent video gambling was
accomplished when the machines were removed from operation and stored.
Therefore, destroying the machines before they could be sold or moved is a
harsh and probably unintended result.
2. The Video Poker Ban as a Regulatory Taking
Another issue of continuing litigation involves whether the ban of video
poker and its subsequent transformation of the machines into contraband will
violate the Takings Clause. If so, the industry may have recourse in which to
recover some of their losses resulting from the ban; if not, the industry will
have little recourse except to sell the machines to operators in other states
before Julyl, 2000.
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment ensures that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.'59 The Takings
Clause promotes fairness and justice in preventing a few people from bearing
public burdens which should be borne by the public as a whole."6 The most
common type of takings case is one in which the government directly
158. 1999 S.C. Acts 125, § 1; S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-21-2710 (West Supp. 1999). As of
July 1, 2000, section 12-21-2710 will be amended to make it unlawful to possess any video
poker machines. 1999 S.C. Acts 125, § 1. Section 12-21-2710 will be amended to read:
It is unlawful for any person to keep on his premises or operate or
permit to be kept on his premises or operated within this State any
vending or slot machine, or any video game machine with a free play
feature operated by a slot in which is deposited a coin or thing of
value, or other device operated by a slot in which is deposited a coin
or thing of value for the play of poker, blackjack, keno, lotto, bingo,
or craps, or any machine or device licensed pursuant to Section 12-
21-2720 and used for gambling or any punch board, pull board, or
other device pertaining to games of chance of whatever name or kind
Any person violating the provisions of this section is guilty of
a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than
five hundred dollars or imprisoned for a period of not more than one
year, or both.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-21-2710 (West Supp. 1999) (eff. Jul. 1, 2000).
159. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
160. Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498,522 (1998).
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appropriates private property for its own use.'6' However, economic regulation
by the government may also be a taking.
Clearly, not every destruction or injury to property by the government
qualifies as a taking.' 63 In evaluating a regulation, courts consider the "justice
and fairness" of the governmental action.' Although there is no set formula,
factors used in analyzing whether the governmental action was unfair include
"the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with investment backed
expectations, and the character of the governmental action."' 65
Although the state-wide ban of video poker does not begin until July 1,
2000, a recent South Carolina Supreme Court case, Mibbs v. South Carolina
Department of Revenue,66 provides a preview of future litigation involving
regulatory takings of video poker machines. In Mibbs, the South Carolina
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling which held that a ban on cash
payouts resulting from the November 1994 local referendums in Oconee and
Anderson Counties did not result in a regulatory taking of Mibbs's property
interest in contracts involving video poker machines. 67
On July 1, 1993 the legislature enacted section 12-21-2806,168 which
provides for local referendums to determine whether to allow cash payouts on
a county-by-county basis.'69 As a result several counties, including Oconee
County and Anderson County, scheduled a local referendum regarding cash
payouts forNovember 1994.170 After section 12-21-2806 was enacted, but prior
to the referendum, Milbbs entered into a five-year contract to place nine video
poker machines in Mibbs's two convenience stores. Under the contract, Mibbs
leased the machines free-of-charge in exchange for surrendering fifty percent
of the profits to the owners of the machines.'' Cash payouts in both counties
became illegal on July 1, 1995 as a result of the referendums, and Mibbs's
stores went out of business shortly after.
72
The supreme court justified its rejection of Mibbs's allegation that the ban
on cash payouts constituted a regulatory taking of his contracts by concluding
that the second regulatory taking factor requiring a reasonable investment-
backed expectation was absent."
161. Id.
162. Id. at 522-23.
163. Id. at523.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 523 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)).
166. 337 S.C. 601, 524 S.E.2d 626 (1999).
167. Id. at 604-05, 524 S.E.2d at 627.
168. S.C. CODEANN. § 12-21-2806 (West Supp. 1999), repealedby 1997 S.C. Acts 53, § 7.
169. Mibbs, 337 S.C. at 604, 524 S.E.2d at 627.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 605, 524 S.E.2d at 627.
172. Id. The court later struck down the law providing for the county referendums as
unconstitutional because it did not apply statewide. Martin v. Condon, 324 S.C. 183,478 S.E.2d
272(1996).
173. Mibbs, 337 S.C. at 605-606, 524 S.E.2d at 628.
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The court determined that Mibbs did not have a reasonable investment-
backed expectation for several reasons. First, Mibbs did not actually invest any
money in the machines. 74 Under the contract, he was only to receive a
percentage of profit from the machines. 75 Second, collateral damages are not
recoverable under the Takings Clause. 76 Mibbs's damages were collateral
because they were only lost profits and the contract did not entitle Mibbs to any
minimum return."u Third, any interest that depends totally upon regulatory
licensing, such as contractual rights to cash payments of video poker machines,
are not considered aproperty interest protected by the takings clause.' Finally,
Mibbs had no reasonable expectation in the value of the five-year contract
because he entered into the contract after the Legislature enacted the statute
providing for the local option referendum.'79
The outcome of Mibbs sets a standard which, if applied to future claims of
video poker operators and owners who stand to lose their machines after July
1, 2000, completely bars, or at least substantially limits, video poker operators'
and owners' recoveries. In light of Mibbs, successful claimants must prove an
actual economic investment in the machines, not just an interest in profits by
allowing machines to be operated on the claimant's premises. In these
situations, claimants will also be barred from recovery because Mibbs limits
recoveries to the value of the machine itself and does not include lost profits.
Furthermore, machines purchased or obtained during a time period when the
continuing legality of the machines was "speculative" will be barred from
recovery. Strictly applied, arguably all machines purchased between July 1993
and June 6, 1997,180 and after June 16, 19998' are outside the scope of
regulatory takings. Finally, video poker machines are not compensable under
the takings clause because they are subject to regulatory licensing.
The court took the point of view that the video poker industry "assumed
the risk" by purchasing video poker machines when gambling was such a
highly debated issue in South Carolina and since there has been a ban
threatened for years. On the other hand, a significant amount of money was
invested into the industry, which also brought revenue to the state.8 2 Although





178. ld; see also Mitchell Arms, Inc. v. United States, 7 F.3d 212 (Fed. Cir. 1993). In
Mitchell Arms, Inc., a firearms importer's investment-backed reliance on a permit for assault
rifles was not "property" to support a claim for compensable taking by the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms because the area of investment activity was voluntarily entered into and
was subject to pervasive governmental control. Id. at 216.
179. Mibbs, 337 S.C .at 607, 524 S.E.2d at 628.
180. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-21-2806 (West Supp. 1999), repealed by S.C. 1997 Acts 53,
§ 7 (repeal approved June 6, 1997).
181. Payout Cap, supra note 46, at 1A. On June 16, 1999, the legislature decided to
schedule a referendum to decide the legality of video poker. Id.
182. McCormick, supra note 3, at 1.
2000 1083
19
Luttrell: Video Poker: A Survey of Recent Developments Surrounding the Lega
Published by Scholar Commons, 2000
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
several occasions when the continuing legality of video poker has been
reinforced. In fact, at least some of the owners and operators relied upon the
decisiveness of the county-by-county referendums in 1994 before investing in
the video poker business. With this in mind, it is hardly clear that video poker
owners and operators were unjustified in relying upon the legality of video
poker when they purchased the machines which likely will become contraband
on July 1, 2000.
V. CONCLUSION
Video pokerhas dominated South Carolina's courts and politics. Even after
the ban takes effect in July of 2000, it is likely that South Carolina's courts will
continue to consider cases based on South Carolina's Gambling Act, the
Takings Clause, and the status of video poker machines as contraband.
The South Carolina Gambling Act creates problems for video poker
owners and operators even after the ban. Friends, families, and even strangers
of players who lost money playing video poker may succeed in collecting three
times the amount lost during a time when owners will not be receiving any
video poker income. Lenient pleading requirements as established underJustice
v. Pantry add to the threat of video poker machine owners and operators having
to defend themselves in lawsuits. Even when video poker becomes illegal,
plaintiffs who gamble illegally may still recover threefold damages for their
losses.
Anyone who presently owns video poker machines stands to lose
considerable money when the machines become contraband on July 1, 2000.
Exposure to liability will not be avoided by merely storing the machines until
a buyer can be found because the machines are considered contraband per se
and can be seized and destroyed by the police even if they are not operational.
Furthermore, owners will have limited, if any, recourse by asserting claims
against the state based on the Takings Clause because their ownership of the
machines is not considered a property interest since it is based on regulatory
licensing.
The cases involving RICO and class certification will no longer affect the
video poker industry after the ban, but will still have an impact on cases
involving other industries. The court's decision in Gentry v. Yonce changes the
presumption that RICO cases arise from fraudulent acts and must be plead with
particularity even in the absence of predicate acts involving fraud. Any two
violations of a statute, which alone may only constitute misdemeanors, may
now be treated as racketeering activity. In fact, RICO violations not alleging
fraudulent acts are now easier to maintain in the absence of a requirement to
plead the elements of a case with particularity.
Depending on the outcome of the class action suits against video poker
owners, more class action suits may follow. The court will encourage future
class action suits against video poker owners and non-related industries if it
183. Wilkinson, supra note 92, at Al.
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allows a class action suit among plaintiffs with little in common with each
other. How Johnson v. Collins Entertainment is decided will constitute
precedent regarding the requirements of class certification.
Overall, even though video poker will be banned on July 1, 2000, the legal
issues decided affect future lawsuits. In fact, the ban will instigate new suits
interpreting the Takings Clause and the fate of thousands of then-valueless
video poker machines. Although many suits appear to stem from social and
political issues, fought through the courts, the decisions arising from the video
poker cases involve important interpretations of South Carolina and federal law
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